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FEDERALISM, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE BRADY ACT:
STATES' RIGHTS AND THE NATIONAL GovERNMENT
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
Barry C. Campbell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Some topics are quick to bring about heated political and personal debates;
topics such as taxes, foreign policy, healthcare, and even welfare readily prompt
a discussion between advocates on both sides of the various issues. A more
obscure topic, federalism-that is, states' rights-also brings about many deep-
seated reactions. Under our system, the ruling bodies are divided into two levels:
federal and state governments. While each is supreme within its own sphere, the
Constitution delegates power to the federal government and reserves power to the
states. Disputes often arise when the federal government attempts to intrude in
an area that is traditionally within the realm of state authority.
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution explicitly states that
citizens have the right to bear arms.1 However, are there any restrictions placed
on this right? Who, constitutionally, has the power to dictate the manner by
which firearms may be purchased? Should the federal government have total
autonomy in this area, or should the states? What about relying on cooperative
federalism?
This Note attempts to analyze the issue of federalism and gun control by exam-
ining the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Printz v. United States,'
which declared provisions of the Brady Act unconstitutional. The issue of states'
rights takes a paramount position in this analysis. This Note examines cases
dealing with the relationship of power between the federal and state govern-
ments.
Petitioner Jay Printz was both the coroner and sheriff of Ravalli County,
Montana.3 Printz, in his capacity as sheriff, was the Chief Law Enforcement
Officer ("CLEO") for Ravalli County.4 Printz "was commanded by 18 U.S.C.
[§] 922(s) to perform background checks and make legal determinations con-
cerning handgun purchases, to destroy records on purchases, and to explain
denials."'
Sheriff Printz's duties were statutorily defined." As a CLEO, Sheriff Printz was
to "preserve the peace, arrest persons who commit public offenses, suppress
* Associate, Wells, Moore, Simmons & Hubbard, Jackson, Mississippi; B.A. Texas Tech University, 1995; M.S.
University of Southern Mississippi, 1996; J.D. Mississippi College School of Law, 1999.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
3. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Printz v. United States, 521 US. 898 (1997) (No. 95-1478).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 3.
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riots, attend court, keep the detention center, and lead search and rescue units."7
In addition to his duties as a CLEO, Printz also served as the county coroner.' In
that capacity, Printz was in charge of holding inquests, determining causes of
death, and notifying next of kin.'
Printz's staff included an "undersheriff, [four] detectives, a lieutenant, a patrol
sergeant, and [seven] deputies. Ravalli County has 30,000 residents in 2400
square miles.""0 Generally, at any given time, only two deputies were on patrol."
According to 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)'s mandate, Printz was to search the following
databases to determine a candidate's fitness to own a firearm: 2 the National
Crime Information Center ("NCIC"), the Criminal Justice Information network
("CIN"), "county court criminal records, which may be hand-searched for crim-
inal convictions and restorations of rights, but would require as much as six
hours driving time one way . . . " state hospital records, civil records, and any
other applicable records.1 3 Printz stated that he had neither an adequate budget
nor the manpower to conduct these searches."
A. Sheriff Mack
Petitioner Richard Mack, like Printz, was a sheriff and thus a CLEO.i" Mack
was the sheriff for Graham County, Arizona, a "sparsely populated rural county
of 4500 square miles inhabited by 28,000 residents."1 Sheriff Mack's office was
staffed by only twelve officers, including himself.7
Mack, like Sheriff Printz, asserted that the Brady Act ("Act") "require[d] him
to search nine categories of records, . . . having varying degrees of accessibili-
ty."18 He claimed that his statutorily defined duties did not include searches of
this type, nor did his budget and personnel numbers allow him to conduct the
searches.19
Sheriff Mack filed suit, alleging that the Brady Act was unconstitutional
because it exceeded congressional power under Article I, Section 8 of the United
States Constitution.20 Mack also claimed that, as enacted, the Act violated the
Tenth and Thirteenth Amendments.21 Finally, Mack alleged that the Act was
''unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."22 As a remedy, Mack sought a "permanent injunction against [the
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The original case was heard by the United States District Court for the District
of Arizona.2" The district court first found, contrary to the government's urging,
that Sheriff Mack had standing to challenge the Act.2" Standing in this case
stemmed from statutory provisions calling for criminal sanctions for a knowing
violation of the Act.2" These provisions placed Sheriff Mack "at risk of criminal
sanctions should he decide to disobey the statute."'2 Additionally, the district
court found that Mack had a "sufficient state interest in the outcome of the pro-
ceedings to justify standing ....
The district court then analyzed Sheriff Mack's allegations regarding the
unconstitutionality of the Act and held that the "Brady Act's provision mandating
that state law enforcement officials perform a background investigation
exceed[ed] Congressional powers under the Commerce Clause, thereby violating
the Tenth Amendment."29 The court took the analysis a step further than Mack's
complaint." The court held that the voluntary provisions of the Act, which were
held constitutional, were severable from the remainder of the Act and stated that
an "invalid provision is severable if the balance of the legislation is capable of
functioning independently from the invalid provision, and the statute functions,
in the absence of the objectionable provision, 'in a manner consistent with the
intent of Congress."' 3 In its order, the district court declared that 18 U.S.C. §
922(s)(2) was unconstitutional and that the federal government was permanently
enjoined from enforcing that particular section of the Act. 2
B. SheriffPrintz
Sheriff Printz's case was heard in the United States District Court for the
District of Montana, Missoula Division, on May 16, 1994.1 Printz, like Mack,
brought suit alleging that the Brady Act was unconstitutional. Printz specifical-
ly alleged that the Act exceeded the authority "delegated to Congress by the
United States Constitution ... and [that it] violate[dJ the Tenth Amendment."3
Printz prayed for relief in the form of both a declaratory judgment stating that the
Act was unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against its operation.
The district court first had to determine if Printz had standing to challenge the
Act.37 The district court, after analyzing the elements for standing, concluded
that Printz was in a position to challenge the constitutionality of the Act.' Printz
argued that the provisions of the Act subjected him to criminal sanctions for fail-
24. Id. at 1372.
25. Id. at 1378.
26. Id. at 1376.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1377.
29. Id. at 1381.
30. Id. at 1382.
31. Id. at 1383 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987)).
32. Id. at 1384.
33. Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
34. Id. at 1506.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1507.
38. Id.
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ure to comply with the statute." Additionally, he claimed that the "background
check provision require[d] CLEOs to perform some type of background check in
every case .... ""
Printz's argument focused on the Act and whether Congress had, by enacting it,
exceeded its constitutional power. 1 Printz specifically alleged that the Act
exceeded congressional power because the "Act mandate[d] duties on the CLEOs
... exceeding Congress' authority under Article I, Section 8 . . ." of the
Constitution."2 In conjunction with this argument was a second argument that the
Act violated the Tenth Amendment. 3 The issue of states' rights was key to
Printz's assertions.
The district court ordered judgment in favor of Sheriff Printz.44 The court
declared the provisions of the Act mandating CLEOs to perform background
checks unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the government from enforc-
ing those provisions." Furthermore, the court severed the unconstitutional provi-
sions from the remainder of the Act, leaving in place the CLEO's ability to vol-
untarily undertake background checks of prospective handgun purchasers." In
both cases, all of the parties appealed. 7 The separate cases were consolidated
into one appeal and heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.48 The sheriffs' focus on appeal was similar: that each district court's
decision regarding the severability of the voluntary check provision of the Act
was improper.49 The government appealed the district courts' findings, alleging
that the courts erred in holding that the disputed provisions were unconstitution-
al."o The Ninth Circuit framed the issue as follows: "No one in this case ques-
tions the fact that regulation of the sales of handguns lies within the broad com-
merce power of Congress. The issue for decision is whether the manner in which
Congress has chosen to regulate in the Brady Act violates the Tenth
Amendment.""1
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the case through the Tenth and Thirteenth
Amendment challenges advocated by both Printz and Mack and through the Fifth
39. Id. at 1509.
40. Id. at 1511. The Act required that the CLEOs must
make a reasonable effort to ascertain within [five] business days whether receipt or possession [of a
firearm] would be in violation of the law, including research in whatever State and local recordkeeping
systems are available .... [If the purchase would not violate the law,] the officer shall . . . destroy the
statement .... If a [CLEO] determines that an individual is ineligible ... and the individual requests...
the officer shall provide such reasons...
why the purchase request was denied. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2)-(6)(C)).
41. Id. at 1512.
42. Id.
43. Id. The court held that the provision of the Act that required the CLEOs to perform background checks
"substantially commandeered state executive officers and indirectly commandeered the legislative processes of
the states to administer a federal program. Accordingly, the court conclude[d] that Congress. .. exceeded [its]
powers... and violated the Tenth Amendment." Id. at 1519.
44. Id. at 1519-20.
45. Id. at 1520.
46. Id.
47. Mack v. United States, 66 E3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 1995).
48. Id. at 1025.
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Amendment claim that the CLEOs were subject to criminal sanctions for failure
to comply with the Act. 2 The court of appeals declined to rule on the Fifth
Amendment challenge, however, stating that until such time as the sheriffs were
prosecuted under the Act, the Fifth Amendment issue was not ripe. 3
The court of appeals reversed the district courts' holding that the "Brady Act
violate[d] neither the Tenth nor Thirteenth Amendment. Mack and Printz's Fifth
Amendment vagueness challenge... [was] not ripe."5"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and clarified the issue as "whether cer-
tain interim provisions of the Brady... Act... commanding state and local law
enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun pur-
chasers and to perform certain related tasks, violate[d] the Constitution."55 The
Court examined the issue using three different modes of analysis: historical
understanding, constitutional construction (or textual analysis), and jurispru-
dence of the Court."
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. 7 He stated simply that
"Congress cannot circumvent ... [the] prohibition [against forcing states to
enforce a federal regulatory program] by conscripting the State's officers direct-
ly." He continued, holding that the federal government cannot command state
officers and officials to carry out a federal regulatory program because such
commands were "fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of
dual sovereignty." 9  The Ninth Circuit, therefore, was reversed.' Chief Justice
Rehnquist, as well as Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas concurred, with
Justices O'Connor and Thomas each delivering separate concurring opinions. 1
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined. 2 Justice Souter filed a separate dissenting opinion as did Justice
Breyer (who was joined by Justice Stevens).'
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
The "Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA), 18 U.S.C. Section 921 et seq., estab-
lishe[d] a detailed federal scheme governing the distribution of firearms."" The
GCA provided a detailed list of persons who were ineligible to purchase or possess
a firearm. 5 Many years later, following the attempted assassination of President
Ronald Reagan and the wounding of James Brady, Congress amended the GCA in
an attempt to provide more security in the area of purchasing handguns. 6 The
52. Id. at 1028, 1033-34.
53. Id. at 1033.
54. Id. at 1034.
55. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997).
56. Id. at 905.
57. Id. at 902.
58. Id. at 935.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 898.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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Brady Act "require[d] the Attorney General to establish a national instant back-
ground check system .... ,"7 Until that system was established, however, certain
interim provisions were enacted to perform the investigatory function of the soon-
to-be-created national agency.' One of those interim provisions required CLEOs
to "make a reasonable effort to ascertain within [five] business days whether
receipt or possession [of a firearm] would be in violation of the law ... ."69 This
requirement seemed to force CLEOs into implementing a federal regulation, thus
violating the Constitution's protection of the division of powers.
A. Federalism
There are a multitude of cases addressing the issue of federalism and the rela-
tionship between the federal government-whether the legislative or the execu-
tive branches-and the state governments. These cases shed light on the "bal-
ance of power" regarding the issue of federalism and states' rights. The
Constitution specifically states that the "powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the People."7
1. Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown
Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown71 arose because of controversy over
a regulation promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
under the Clean Air Act ("CAA").72 The Supreme Court granted certiorari after
various courts of appeals rendered conflicting decisions as to the constitutionali-
ty of certain provisions of the CAA.73 The Court summarized the issue as
whether the EPA Administrator had the authority "to compel various types of
implementation and enforcement actions ... [on] the States."74
The provisions under scrutiny were those requiring the states to prescribe auto-
mobile emissions testing, to develop and monitor retrofit programs, and to desig-
nate preferential bus and carpool lanes in an effort to reduce overall air
pollution.7" The states were forced to develop some form of plan to comply with
the statutory mandates.76 The most controversial provision in the program was
42 U.S.C. § 1 13(a)(1)(B), which allowed the EPA Administrator to bring a civil
action against any state that was non-compliant with the statute.77
The constitutionality of these provisions was challenged, and the "United
States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth, Fourth, and District of Columbia Circuits
struck them down. All of the courts rested on statutory interpretation, but noted
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
71. 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 100.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 101.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 102.
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also that serious constitutional questions might be raised if the statute were read
as the United States argued it should be." 8
Many strange occurrences took place when the case reached the Supreme
Court. The government re-evaluated its original position by first stating that
Congress was considering repealing the required bus purchasing provision of the
CAA (one of the offending provisions);79 therefore, that specific issue was
removed from consideration by the Court.8 Second, and more importantly, "the
federal parties ... [did not] merely renounce[ ] an intent to pursue certain speci-
fied regulations; they ... admit[ted] that those [provisions] remaining in contro-
versy [were] invalid unless modified in certain respects."81
By changing its original position, the government essentially emasculated its
appeal. The Court refused to "pass upon the EPA regulations" for fear that doing
so would be "an advisory opinion." 2 The Court simply vacated the decisions of
the various courts of appeals and remanded the case on questions of mootness.'
For federalism issues, this case is important for one reason. It illustrates the
idea that Congress will pass legislation knowing it violates its constitutional
authority.
2. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass 'n
In Hodel,84 the Supreme Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of
certain provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act ("Surface
Act"). The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
declared several central provisions of the Surface Act unconstitutional and per-
manently enjoined their enforcement.8" The Court framed the issue, relating to
federalism, as whether or not Congress surpassed Fifth and Tenth Amendment
limitations on congressional power when it enacted the Surface Act.8" The
Supreme Court concluded that the Surface Act was constitutional.
The controversial provision, (section 501, 30 U.S.C. § 1251), "establishe[d] a
two-stage program for the regulation of surface mining: an initial, or interim
regulatory phase, and a subsequent, permanent phase."8 Under the interim
stage, the Department of Interior was to establish an inspection and enforcement
program to be implemented in each state. 9 States subject to the federal stan-
dards were allowed to issue their own permits and conduct their own inspections
and enforcement programs. Further, each state had the option of voluntarily
78. Id. (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 103.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 103-04.
83. Id. at 104.
84. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (198 1).
85. Id. at 268.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 269.
89. Id. at 270.
90. Id.
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establishing its own program instead of relying exclusively on the Department of
Interior's program." "The States ... [were] not, however, required to enforce
the interim regulatory standards [as established by the Department of Interior]
and, until the permanent phase of the program, the Secretary... [was not permit-
ted to] cede the Federal Government's independent enforcement role to States
that wish[ed] to conduct their own regulatory programs." 2 The states were per-
mitted to undertake a participatory role in the regulations. This dual participa-
tion is known as cooperative federalism.
Indeed, the Supreme Court reasoned that the "Surface Mining Act establishe[d]
a program of cooperative federalism that allow[ed] the States, within limits
established by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own reg-
ulatory programs.. . ."' The rationale behind the Court's decision was simple.
These provisions allowed for voluntary state participation in the program; thus,
Congress did not force the states to legislate according to its dictates. Rather, the
Surface Act, according to the Court's reasoning, made use of the concept of dual
sovereignty and cooperative federalism. The states and the federal government
could establish regulation plans, each independent of the other.
3. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") controversy94 arose
over certain provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
("PURPA"). 5 Mississippi believed that PURPA violated the Tenth Amendment. 8
PURPA had three primary goals: to conserve energy, to optimize the efficiency
of the plant facilities, and to "encourage" fair rates. 7 "To achieve these goals,
Titles I and III [of PURPA] direct[ed] state utility regulatory commissions and
nonregulated utilities to 'consider' the adoption and implementation of specific
'rate design' and regulatory standards."' 8
PURPA was drafted in a peculiar fashion. Much of the statutory language
phrased requirements as something that the states were to "consider."'99 PURPA
required the states to consider implementing reporting requirements, rate sched-
ules, and standards relating to electrical service. ' Nothing in the Act was com-
pletely mandatory, and despite "the extent and detail of the ... proposals[,]...
no state authority or non-regulated utility [was] required to adopt or implement
the specified rate design or regulatory standards." '1
91. Id.
92. Id. at 271.
93. Id. at 289.
94. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
95. Id. at 742.
96. Id. at 752.
97. Id. at 746.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 746, 749-50.
100. Id. at 747, 749.
101. Id. at 749-50.
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PURPA added more language that lessened any burden on the states. Congress
recognized that a state's compliance with the requirements of PURPA would
involve the expenditure of funds. Accordingly, it authorized the Secretary of
Energy to make grants to state regulatory authorities to assist them in carrying
out the provisions of Titles I and 11.102
The district court held that Congress had exceeded its power when it enacted
PURPA.'0 3 The court concluded that PURPA violated the Commerce Clause and,
in federalism terms, that PURPA "trenche[d] on state sovereignty.""1 ' The FERC
and the Secretary of Energy appealed.'
The key analysis in FERC, for questions of federalism, was the Supreme
Court's Tenth Amendment analysis. The Court admitted that through PURPA,
"the Federal Government attempt[ed] to use state regulatory machinery to
advance federal goals.""1 6 The Court divided its analysis by PURPA's three
requirements.
According to the Court, the first requirement, state enforcement of federal
standards, "d[id] nothing more than pre-empt conflicting state enactments in the
traditional way."10 7 The power of the federal government to pre-empt certain
fields is an old and well-established principle. 10 8 Under this first requirement,
the utilities were to "purchase electricity from, and ... sell it to ... small power
production facilities."'0 9 The Court implied that this was not an onerous bur-
den. "0 According to FERC, the states could have fulfilled this requirement sim-
ply by "undertaking to resolve disputes between qualifying facilities and electric
utilities .... ."'" The Court stated that Mississippi, as well as other states, normal-
ly and routinely engaged in this form of administration and dispute resolution. 2
The second requirement under PURPA was "[m]andatory [c]onsideration of
[s]tandards."'' Although under traditional theories of state sovereignty the fed-
eral government is not able to force the state legislatures to vote or implement
federal nolic.v cniirt will sometimPe iinhnld federnl stntites thnt dirpt the !.eric-
latures "to take or to refrain from taking certain actions."' 14 The Court listed
numerous examples to support this contention, and concluded that under that
jurisprudence, the "Federal Government has some power to enlist a branch of
state government.. . to further federal ends."11
The Supreme Court's final conclusion was that PURPA was a constitutional
expression of congressional power.1 ' The Court quickly noted that Congress
102. Id. at 751.
103. Id. at 752.
104. Id. at 753.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 759.
107. Id.
108. See, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 286 (1981).
109. FERC, 456 U.S. at 759-60.
110. Id. at 760.
111. Id. (citing 18 C.ER. § 292.401(a) (1980)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 761.
114. Id. at 762.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 771.
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could have simply pre-empted the utilities field.'17 Instead, Congress gave the
states an opportunity to participate, following the theory of cooperative federal-
ism in regulating the energy producers.118 Congress' only requirement for allow-
ing state participation was that the states had to consider the suggested standards
established by the government. 19 Based on this reasoning, the Court reversed
the case. 2
4. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority2' focused on the proce-
dures of federal government action as a form of protection of state sovereignty,
rather than placing reliance on substantive law for protection.122 The Court in
this case (as it had in other cases) took a different view of Tenth Amendment
restrictions and their relationship to states' power and sovereignty.
12 3
In Garcia, a "federal district court concluded that municipal ownership and
operation of a mass-transit system [was] a traditional governmental function and
thus... [was] exempt from the obligations imposed by the [Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA")]. '"2 The Supreme Court analyzed the issue of whether the San
Antonio Mass Transit Authority ("SAMTA"), as a government entity, was subject
to the "minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA.' 25 SAMTA
sued the Secretary of Labor claiming that the FLSA did not apply to it. 26 Garcia,
a SAMTA employee, brought an action (along with other SAMTA employees)
against SAMTA for "overtime pay [allegedly due] under the FLSA."'27 Garcia's
suit was stayed pending the outcome of the first suit filed by SAMTA.'28 Garcia
was allowed, however, to intervene as a defendant with the Secretary of Labor.'29
The district court, in granting SAMTA's motion for summary judgment, uti-
lized the "traditional" test of whether SAMTA was a function of local govern-
ment. 30 The Secretary and Garcia appealed directly to the Supreme Court under
a statutory grant of authority. 3' The Court vacated the district court's judgment
and remanded the case for further consideration in light of a recent Supreme
Court decision in a similar type of case. 32 On remand, the district court again
entered judgment for SAMTA,133 reasoning that the state "had engaged in a long-
117. Id. at 769.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 771.
121. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
122. Id. at 552.
123. Id. at 548-49.
124. Id. at 530.
125. Id. at 533.




130. Id. at 535.
131. Id.
132. Id. (referring to Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982)).
133. Id.
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standing pattern of public regulation, and that this regulatory tradition gave rise
to an 'inference of sovereignty."'134
The Secretary of Labor and Garcia appealed again. 3 ' On this appeal, the
Court requested that the parties consider a different issue: whether "or not the
principles of the Tenth Amendment as set forth in National League of Cities v.
Usery s6 . . . should be reconsidered[.]"' 37
a. National League Test
National League of Cities v. Usery outlined four conditions to be met before a
"state activity [could] be deemed immune from a particular federal regulation
under the Commerce Clause." '38 First, the states had to be regulated as states. 39
Second, the statute "must 'address matters that are ... attribute[s] of state sover-
eignty."" 4 Third, the regulation must interfere with the state's ability to legislate
in areas traditionally controlled by state legislation. 4 And finally, "the relation
of state and federal interests must not be such that 'the nature of the federal inter-
est ... justifies state submission."' 42 According to the Court, the third condition
caused the controversy in the case.'
b. Application of the National League Test to Garcia
The Court's analysis in Garcia focused on the third condition of the National
League test, concluding that it was not a sound mode of analysis of government
functions.144 The majority found that the historical function test (test three)
resulted in "line-drawing of the most arbitrary sort . . . .""I Based on this state-
ment, the Court rejected "as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a
rule of state immunity ... that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particu-
lar governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional.". 4. The Court chose a dif-
ferent "test" altogether, one that focused on procedural rather than suhsitqntive
aspects of law.' 7
The Supreme Court's new test was derived from the Tenth Amendment. The
Court held that the Tenth Amendment limited the power of the states, not the
power of the federal government.' " The Tenth Amendment, as viewed by the
134. Id. (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 536.
136. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
137. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985) (citation omitted). National
League of Cities v. Usery, which addressed the principles of the Tenth Amendment and states' rights, was over-
ruled by Garcia.
138. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citation omitted).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 538.
144. Id. at 543-44.
145. Id. at 544.
146. Id. at 546-47.
147. Id. at 557.
148. Id. at 548.
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Court, contracted the power and sovereignty of the states by withdrawing many
powers from the states as a whole. " 9 "Section 8 of. . Article [I] work[ed] an
equally sharp contraction of state sovereignty by authorizing Congress to exer-
cise a wide range of legislative powers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI) to displace contrary state legislation."'50
According to the Court, the safeguards of state sovereignty did not necessarily
come from the Tenth Amendment. Instead, they came from the structure of the
federal government itself."'1 "It [was] no novelty to observe that the composition
of the Federal Government was designed ... to protect the States from over-
reaching by Congress." ' 2 Procedural safeguards were instituted by the Framers
to protect the states; these safeguards were better as a means of protecting the
states than the "judicially created limitation on federal power" that would result
from using the Tenth Amendment only to limit federal power.'53 The Court's
message of process over substance was clear. As a result, the FLSA's wage
requirements could apply to SAMTA employees without violating state sover-
eignty.
5. New York v. United States
New York v. United States... was another case that dealt with federal regulation
and perceived violations of state sovereignty.' At the heart of New York were
various provisions of the Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1985 ("LRWPA") that the State of New York believed to be unconstitutional
on several grounds.' At the beginning of the opinion, Justice O'Connor explic-
itly stated that "the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability sim-
ply to compel" the states to regulate according to federal dictates. 7
The LRWPA mandated the states, either in their individual capacities or in
regional compacts with other states, to dispose of the low-level radioactive waste
generated in each respective state. 8 The states (either individually or in regional
compacts) were to allow non-sited states to dispose of the waste in the sited
states (the sites were to remain available for seven years). 9 During that time, the
sited states could place a surcharge on the waste brought to the disposal sites
from the non-sited states."w After seven years, the sited states could exclude out-
side-generated waste from their disposal sites. 6'
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 550.
152. Id. at 550-51.
153. Id. at 552.
154. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
155. Id. at 149.
156. Id. at 144.
157. Id. at 149.
158. Id. at 151 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1981)).
159. Id. at 152.
160. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(1) (Supp. V 1981)).
161. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(c) (Supp. V 1981)).
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The LRWPA provided three types of incentives: monetary incentives, access to
the waste sites, and a take title provision.182 The monetary incentives stated that
one-fourth of any surcharge collected from the non-sited generators was to be
held in escrow by the Secretary of Energy."u A January 1993 deadline was set
under which each state was to either have joined a regional compact or instituted
its own disposal facility.1 '6 "Each State that ha[d] not met the 1993 deadline
[had] either [to] take title to the waste generated within its borders or forfeit to
the waste generators the incentive payments it ha[d] received."
165
The second incentive, the access incentive, built onto the first incentive the
added risk of increased cost to gain access to dispose of low-level waste.' The
states that failed to meet the established deadlines for fulfilling certain criteria
were subject to incremental increases in the allowable surcharge (charged by the
sited-states) for access to the sited-states' disposal facility.8 7
The take title provision was the third and most severe provision." Basically,
this "incentive" dictated that if a state which produced low-level radioactive
waste had not entered into a regional compact or could not dispose of its waste
otherwise, that state "shall take title to the waste, be obligated to take possession
of the waste, and ... be liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred by
such generator or owner as a consequence of the failure of the State to take pos-
session of the waste ....9
These three provisions were the basis of New York's suit against the United
States. New York originally sought a declaratory judgment that "the [LRWPA
was] inconsistent with the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments . . ., with the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and with the Guarantee Clause of
Article VI of the Constitution.1 7 ° The district court dismissed the complaint, and
on appeal New York modified its complaint to allege only that the LRWPA vio-
lated the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause. 7'
JU0L1 a %. 1J.UlJL 0 upmuu I OLU..t LVVU vaya LV ani1IL , 1-ALI u"It 11J-L0L a ,a1-
lenges"7 The first mode of analysis was an inquiry by the Court into "whether
an Act of Congress [was] authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress
in Article I of the Constitution."'' 3 The second mode of analysis was questioning
whether the act "invade[d] the province of State sovereignty reserved by the
Tenth Amendment."'' Sometimes, however, as in New York, the "two inquiries
are mirror images of each other."'
162. Id. at 152-53.
163. Id. at 152.
164. Id. at 152-53.




169. Id. at 153-54.
170. Id. at 154.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 155.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 156.
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According to the Court, the issue in New York was to determine how Congress
could "use the States as implements of regulation; that is, whether Congress may
direct or otherwise motivate the States to regulate in a particular field or a partic-
ular way. '  New York agreed that Congress had the power to simply pre-empt
the field; the state's challenge was based upon the manner in which the govern-
ment tried to force the states to regulate the disposal of low-level radioactive
waste. 77 New York viewed the LRWPA as a direct requirement that the state reg-
ulate according to congressional desire. 78
Justice O'Connor was quick to note that "[a]s an initial matter, Congress may
not simply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly com-
pelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program."'" 9 There are,
however, Court-sanctioned methods that Congress may use to persuade states to
act in certain ways. "First, under Congress' spending power, 'Congress may
attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds . . ."' and second, under the
power of the Commerce Clause, the theory of cooperative federalism is a possi-
ble course of action 8 Cooperative federalism permits the states to either partic-
ipate by regulating the activity according to federal standards or allow the federal
government to pre-empt the field.81 Either of these two methods is acceptable to
the Court.
Important considerations weigh in the balance when claiming that either
method is acceptable. First, the people of the state maintain the final authority in
deciding whether the state will regulate, or if it will allow the federal government
to step in and pre-empt the field. 82 The second concern is the issue of account-
ability. 83 When the "Federal Government compels the States to regulate, the
accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished." '84
The Court found the first two of the three provisions in question to be constitu-
tionally adequate. 8 "The take title provision [was, however,] of a different char-
acter .... In this provision Congress ... crossed the line distinguishing encour-
agement from coercion.""18 The government listed three times when this type of
action is acceptable. The first is when the "federal interest is sufficiently impor-
tant to justify state submission." '87 The Court's response was that no "matter how
powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not give
Congress the authority to require the states to regulate." 88 Congress may, how-
ever, utilize cooperative federalism to ensure state action, or Congress may pre-
empt the field. 89
176. Id. at 161.
177. Id. at 160.
178. Id. at 169.
179. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
180. Id. at 167.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 168.
183. Id.
184. ld.
185. Id. at 173-74.
186. Id. at 174-75.
187. Id. at 177.
188. Id. at 178.
189. Id.
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The government's second argument was that, in limited circumstances, the
Constitution permits "federal directives to state governments.""19 The govern-
ment listed several cases that dealt with the Supremacy Clause.19' The Court's
response was that all of the government's cases involved "congressional regula-
tion of individuals, not congressional requirements that States regulate." '92
The government's third and final argument was that the "Constitution envi-
sion[ed] a role for Congress as an arbiter of interstate disputes." '93 The Court
acknowledged that the Framers may have indeed envisioned Congress assuming
the role of arbiter, but the Court did not believe that the Framers meant for
Congress to undertake that role by "mandating state regulation." '94
The Court's conclusion was clear: the "Federal Government may not compel
the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." '95 Congress may,
however, ensure state action by controlling the purse strings or by undertaking
the use of cooperative federalism.
B. Federalism and the Brady Act
A number of cases were litigated that combined issues of federalism as
"defined" by the Supreme Court and the enactment of the Brady Act. These
cases were factually similar in nature to the main case in this Note, Printz v.
United States. Each case was brought by a sheriff or CLEO who claimed that the
Act was unconstitutional. These cases include McGee v. United States,196 Frank
v. United States,'97 and Koog v. United States.'98 Two cases were decided in a
similar manner to the lower court's decision in the Topic Case. The third, howev-
er, was not.
1. McGee v. United States
In McGee, 99 the plaintiff, a sheriff in Forrest County., Mississippi, challenged
the provisions of the Brady Act that required him to perform the mandatory
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers. 00 Specifically, Sheriff
McGee sought "a declaratory judgment that the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act ... [was] unconstitutional and . a permanent injunction pro-
hibiting the Defendant's enforcement thereof."'' McGee claimed that the Act
commandeered state officers into executing federal policy in violation of the
190. Id.
191. Id. See also, Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
192. New York, 505 U.S. at 179.
193. Id. at 180.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 188.
196. McGee v. United States, 863 E Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
197. Frank v. United States, 78 E3d 815 (2d Cir. 1996).
198. Koog v. United States, 79 E3d 452 (5th Cir. 1996).
199. McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 321.
200. Id. at 323.
201. Id.
1999]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Tenth Amendment.0 2 Sheriff McGee, like Sheriffs Printz and Mack, alleged that
the criminal sanctions provision was unconstitutionally vague in light of the Fifth
Amendment.
0 3
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
agreed that McGee had standing to challenge on the first claim, but held that he
did not have standing to bring his Fifth Amendment challenge, as he was "not
under any danger of criminal prosecution regardless of whether he [did] or [did]
not make the required background check ....
The district court was "mindful" that the Supreme Court had, in previous
instances, tacitly approved legislation similar to the Brady Act that made use of
cooperative federalism. 0 The trial court, however, examined the language of the
Act and found that it did not make use of the cooperative federalism theory.08
"Congress, in the Brady Bill, did not give local sheriffs the option of cooperating
with federal officials.' 27 Based on this reasoning, the district court stated that
Congress could not compel state officials to implement federal policy.
08
2. Koog v. United States
Koog2°9 involved the same type of challenge made by Sheriff McGee. Koog
was the sheriff of Val Verde County, Texas.20 Koog filed suit "seeking a declara-
tion that [the Brady Act] violated the Tenth and Fifth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of that sec-
tion. ' 211 Koog based his challenge to the Act upon the same theory argued by
McGee, Printz, and Mack, the theory that Congress cannot compel state officers
to execute federal policy.
2 2
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas found Koog
to have standing to bring the Tenth Amendment challenge, but did not find stand-
ing for his Fifth Amendment challenge. 3 The district court concluded that
"Sheriff Koog's constitutional challenge to the Brady Act must fail. '21' The court
acknowledged that Koog did have standing, to a limited degree, but failed to see
how the Act violated the Tenth Amendment.215 Additionally, the court did not
believe that the Act commandeered state officials.
218
The government (in the McGee case) and Sheriff Koog appealed their cases to
the Fifth Circuit. 217 The appeals were consolidated, and the court considered both
202. Id. at 324.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 325.
206. Id. at 326.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 327.
209. Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
210. Id. at 1377-78.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1380-81, 1388.
214. Id. at 1389.
215. Id. at 1380-81, 1388.
216. Id. at 1389.
217. Koog v. United States, 79 E3d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1996).
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sides of the argument. "On appeal, the sheriffs argue[d] that the interim provi-
sions of the Act violate[d] the Tenth Amendment by compelling them to adminis-
ter the Brady Act... "218 The government, on appeal, argued that under the the-
ory of cooperative federalism, the Act should survive a constitutional attack.219
The Fifth Circuit examined the Tenth Amendment in great detail to see if the
interim provision encroached on state sovereignty.22 The Fifth Circuit found that
it did: "The Brady Act imposes new federally-prescribed, non-discretionary
tasks on actors, the CLEOs, . without the consent or participation of the
States." '221
3. Frank v. United States
The Fifth Circuit's decision and rationale was opposed to the Second Circuit's
ruling on this issue.22 Frank, a sheriff in Vermont, brought a challenge against
the Brady Act that was similar in scope to the other sheriffs' claims.223 He
claimed that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment.22 Frank appealed to the
Second Circuit after the district court ruled "that he lacked standing to challenge
[the Brady Act] on Fifth Amendment grounds and that the background check
provision [was] severable from the remainder of the Act."22
The Second Circuit, like the other courts, first checked to see if Frank had
standing. It concluded that he did, in fact, have standing to challenge the Act, but
only on the Tenth Amendment grounds.22 The court's analysis of the Tenth
Amendment was similar to all of the other courts'-analyses. The Second Circuit,
however, reached an opposite conclusion, finding that the Act did not violate the
Tenth Amendment.227 The Second Circuit reversed the district court's holding
that the Act was unconstitutional.22 Following the Second Circuit's holding,
Frank appealed to the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remand-
ed the case "to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for fur-
ther consideration in light of Printz.1
22
The circuit courts of appeals were split over the constitutionality of the Brady
Act's mandatory background check provisions. This split of opinion set the stage
for the Supreme Court to review the Act in the Printz case.
C. The Brady Act
The Brady Act is codified in the various portions of 18 U.S.C. § 922. The Act
required the performance of various duties by different individuals and agencies
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 457.
221. Id. at 463.
222. See, Frank v. United States, 78 E3d 815 (2d. Cir. 1996).
223. Id. at 821.
224. Id. at 819.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 822, 825.
227. Id. at 834.
228. Id.
229. Frank v. United States, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
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when a request for a handgun purchase was made. Section 922(s)(2) placed a
burden on the CLEO to make a reasonable background check of any prospective
firearms purchaser.23 The prospective purchaser must complete a "Brady Form,"
which is then given to the CLEO.3 ' The purpose of this requirement was to
ensure that the purchaser was not a member of a restricted class, as defined in
section 922(s)(3)(B)(i)-(vii) 32 Section 922(s)(6)(B) states that "[u]nless the
[CLEO] to whom a statement is transmitted ... determines that a transaction
would violate Federal, State or local law. . .," he is to destroy the statement with-
in twenty days.233
IV INSTANT CASE
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Printz and Mack following their con-
solidated appeal to the Ninth Circuit.234 The district courts (both in Arizona and
Montana) ruled that the provision of the Brady Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2), which
required all CLEOs to perform a background check of potential handgun pur-
chasers, was unconstitutional.2 5 The district courts also held that this provision
was severable from the rest of the Act, thereby leaving the majority of the Act
intact.2 13 The Ninth Circuit, however, "reversed, finding none of the Brady Act's
interim provisions to be unconstitutional. 237
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.238 Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, filed a dissenting opin-
ion.239 Justices O'Connor and Thomas each filed a concurring opinion, while
Justice Breyer filed a separate dissenting opinion in which Justice Stevens
joined.
24
A. Justice Scalia ' Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia immediately phrased the issue as "whether certain interim provi-
sions of the [Brady Act], commanding state and local law enforcement officers
to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers and to per-
form certain related tasks, violate[d] the Constitution. 241 The Act, which amend-
ed the Gun Control Act ("GCA") of 1968, called for certain interim provisions to
230. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994).
231. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(IIl) (1994).
232. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(3)(B)(i)-(vii) (1994). The listed class includes those who are not convicted felons or
have been convicted of domestic abuse; are not a fugitive; are not addicted to drugs or any controlled substance;
are not insane; are not an illegal or unlawful alien; have not been dishonorably discharged from the military; or,
a person who has renounced his United States citizenship.
233. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(B) (1994).
234. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
235. Id at 904.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 900.
239. Id. at 900-01.
240. Id. at 900.
241. Id. at 901.
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be implemented until the "national instant background check system" required
by the Act could be established.24 Three interim duties were designated by the
Act, only one of which was really at issue.
Under the interim provisions, a gun dealer, prior to making a sale of a handgun
must
(1) [r]eceive from the transferee a statement (the Brady Form) . . . containing
the name, address and date of birth of the proposed transferee along with a
swom statement that the transferee is not among any of the classes of prohibited
purchasers...; (2) verify the identity of the transferee by examining an identi-
fication document ... ; and (3) provide the "chief law enforcement officer"
(CLEO) of the transferee's residence with notice of the contents . . . of the
Brady Form .... 243
The third provision was the controversial one: when the CLEO received the
Brady Statement, he was required to "make a reasonable effort to ascertain...
whether receipt or possession would be in violation of the law . . ."'" This
determination was made by researching the prospective purchaser's background
in whatever research resources were available.4
Following the initial determination, if the CLEO decided that a sale would be
in violation of the law, "he must, upon request, provide the would-be-purchaser
with a written statement of the reasons for that determination. 242 The CLEO
must then destroy any documents that he had pertaining to a proposed transfer of
a weapon.247
Based on the duties required by the Brady Act, Scalia surmised that the Act
essentially impressed state officers into the service of the federal government.
2
18
The analysis of this issue (whether the Act did in fact "impress" state officers,
contrary to the division of powers established in the Constitution) was divided
into three topic areas: (1) an historical understanding, (2) the structure of the
Constitution (textualism), and (3) the jurisprudence of the Court.
249
1. Historical Understanding
The "Petitioners contend[ed] that compelled enlistment of state executive offi-
cers for the administration of federal programs [was] ... unprecedented. '20 The
government took the opposite view and offered "proof" that Congress has
always enacted statutes that required state officers to implement federal regulato-
ry programs. 2 1 "The government [offered by way of example] that statutes
enacted by the first Congresses required state courts to record applications for
242. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1968).
243. Printz, 521 U.S. at 903.
244. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994)).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 904.
248. Id.
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citizenship,... to transmit abstracts of citizenship applications and other natural-
ization records ... and to register aliens seeking naturalization and issue certifi-
cates of registry . *.". ."I" Justice Scalia countered this argument, stating that
these laws were designed to be an obligation on state judges "to enforce federal
prescriptions.., related to matters appropriate for the judicial power."2 3 Scalia
did not believe this argument was persuasive enough to justify the "supposed"
power of Congress to impress state officials."4
Justice Scalia relied on portions of The Federalist Papers in an attempt to glean
what the Framers might have intended when they wrote the Constitution and to
possibly shed light on the historical understanding of the Constitution."' The
government used various letters from The Federalist to support its position of
utilizing state officials to implement the Act.25 ' The government quoted
Hamilton when urging that the Constitution "would 'enable the [national] gov-
ernment to employ the ordinary magistracy of each [state] in the execution of its
laws.""'2 7 Madison's statement that when needed for the "organization of the
judicial power, the officers of the States will be clothed in the ... authority of the
Union" was another argument used by the government to illustrate that the
Federalists and the Framers anticipated that state officers would be utilized by
the federal government."'
Justice Scalia concluded that the government simply missed the point:
"[N]one of [the] statements [in The Federalist] necessarily implie[d] . . . that
Congress could impose [those] responsibilities without the consent of the States.
They appear to rest on the natural assumption that the States would consent to
allowing their officials to assist the Federal Government .... ,2.9 Scalia conced-
ed that all state officers are duty-bound to uphold the United States Constitution,




Justice Scalia's second analysis was based on an understanding of the
Constitution's text.261 This analysis began with the basic assumption that the
Constitution created a system of dual sovereignty, and that "[a]lthough the States
surrendered many of their powers to the ... Federal Government, they retained a
[degree of] sovereignty." '262
252. Id. at 905-06 (citations omitted).
253. Id. at 907.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 910.
256. Id. at 910-19; THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 30, 44, 45 (James
Madison).
257. Printz, 521 U.S. at 910 (citation omitted).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 910-11.
261. Id. at 918.
262. Id. at 918-19.
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In this analysis, as in the historical understanding portion, Scalia relied on the
various works in The Federalist Papers to shed some light on the intent of the
Framers." The use of The Federalist led to many conclusions on questions of
sovereignty that supported the majority opinion." ' The Framers feared the tyran-
ny of a strong national government.26 This fear was the basis for the Federalists'
espousing the idea of reliance upon dual sovereignty to reduce the threat of
tyranny.2 As Scalia said, the "power of the Federal Government would be aug-
mented immeasurably if it were able to impress into service . . . the police offi-
cers of the [fifty] states."'26
Justice Scalia's analysis then changed direction and examined various constitu-
tional provisions that supported the majority. First and foremost, the
Constitution explicitly states that the Executive Branch is responsible for imple-
menting the laws passed by Congress." This is reflected in Article II, Section
3.2"' "The Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility to thousands of
CLEOs ... who... [must] implement the program without ... Presidential con-
trol. .. .""0 Scalia continued along this vein of analysis of control and imple-
mentation of the law by concluding, on this point, that the power of the President
would be unconstitutionally reduced if Congress could pass legislation such as
the Brady Act, thus allowing state officials and officers to perform the
President's constitutional role in implementing the laws of the United States.27'
The division of power between the two levels of government, he argued, needed
to be maintained.
27 2
Justice Scalia and the majority agreed with Alexander Hamilton's statement
that the people were the "'only proper objects of government.' ' '273 In other
words, according to Scalia's analysis, "the Framers rejected the concept of a cen-
tral government that would act upon and through the States, and instead designed
a system in which the state and federal governments would exercise concurrent
authority over the people. ' 274 Following that line of resnning, Scalia Qnta flat
Congress lacked the constitutional authority to directly force the states to act, as
it had done in passing the controversial provisions of the Act.275
3. Precedent
Justice Scalia's final analysis was precedent.276 Scalia relied upon several
Supreme Court opinions stating that Congress cannot compel the states to imple-
263. Id. at 919-20.
264. Id. at 920.
265. Id. at 922.
266. Id. at 920.






273. Id. at 920 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton)).
274. Id. at 919-20.
275. Id. at 924 (citation omitted).
276. Id. at 925.
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ment federal regulatory programs, nor can it commandeer state governments. 7
Scalia noted that even when cases revolving around this issue were brought
before the circuit courts of appeals, many were "invalidated ... on statutory
grounds in order to avoid . . .[the] . . .grave constitutional issues." '278 When
these cases reached the Supreme Court, the government, perhaps sensing that the
acts were unconstitutional, would not even defend the challenged statutes. 79 The
Court then simply "remanded [them] for consideration of mootness.''28
One of the government's key defenses was that the Act did not "require state
legislative or executive officials to make policy, but instead issue[d] a final direc-
tive to state CLEOs. 281 Scalia and the majority disagreed with this argument.
Scalia commented that the government's distinction between policy-making and
implementation was similar to the "line that separates proper congressional con-
ferral of Executive power from unconstitutional delegation of legislative authori-
ty for federal separation-of-powers purposes." '282 Scalia inferred that if the Act
called for policy-making, it would be similar to the delegation of legislative
authority to the President, and, therefore, the Act would be unconstitutional.2"
The question of policy-making versus implementation, by itself, is not conclu-
sive proof of unconstitutionality. The Act, even if classified as merely calling for
the implementation of federal law, can still be held unconstitutional if it intrudes
upon state sovereignty.28 ' In this scenario the states and its officers remain
autonomous.28 To make this point clear, Scalia stated that to hold otherwise
would, by an extension of logic, allow one to say that it would be constitutional
for officers of the United States to be "impressed into service for the execution
of state laws.
286
The Petitioners put forth the argument that, in forcing state officers to imple-
ment the federal regulations, the degree of accountability was shifted between
the federal and state governments.287 This shifting could work both ways and be
either advantageous or disadvantageous to either the state or federal government.
For example, as the majority stated, by "forcing state governments to absorb the
financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, . . . Congress
can take credit for 'solving' problems" without having to expend federal funds.28
If, however, the program failed and there was public backlash, Congress could
then simply place the blame on the states. 89
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. (citation omitted). See Maryland v. EPA, 530 E2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA, 52 E2d 827
(9th Cir. 1975).
280. Printz, 521 U.S. at 925.
281. Id. at 926.
282. Id. at 927.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 928.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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B. Justice O'Connor s Concurrence
Justice O'Connor began by stating that "[o]ur precedent and our Nation's his-
torical practices support the Court's holding.""29 Justice O'Connor added that the
CLEOs were free to perform background checks on a voluntary basis.291
C. Justice Thomas s Concurrence
Justice Thomas supported the majority opinion's rationale but wrote a separate
concurring opinion in order to "emphasize that the Tenth Amendment affirms the
undeniable notion that under [the] Constitution, the Federal Government is one
of enumerated, hence limited, powers." '292 The federal government simply did not
(and does not) have the power to impress state officers.293
D. Justice Stevens ' Dissent
Justice Stevens began his dissenting opinion with the basic premise that
"[w]hen Congress exercise[d] the powers delegated to it by the Constitution, it..
• impose[d] affirmative obligations on executive and judicial officers of state and
local governments." '294 He claimed that the Constitution, the history of America,
the jurisprudence of the Court, and "a correct understanding of the basic struc-
ture of the Federal Government" substantiated this premise.295 Justice Stevens
essentially analyzed the issue in the same manner as Justice Scalia; Justice
Stevens, however, came to a different conclusion.
Justice Stevens believed that the Petitioners' argument was not an issue worth
concern. According to him, the question presented was similar to other pieces of
legislation that Congress had enacted that allowed the impressment of various
state officers into federal service.2 96 Stevens continued this frame of analysis by
citing numerous examples of when, in times of national emergency, Congress
utilized state officers to implement federal programs.297 The draft, air raid war-
dens, and the "inoculation of children," Stevens reasoned, "may require a nation-
al response before federal personnel can ... respond.""29  According to Justice
Stevens, the power to pass legislation similar to the Brady Act existed.
Stevens analogized what Congress declared as an "'epidemic of gun violence'
to a national emergency under which, he argued, Congress clearly had the power
to enact the Brady Act.299 He also claimed that the majority embarked on a poli-
cy-making expedition with its decision.00
290. Id. at 935.
291. Id. at 936.
292. Id. (citations omitted).
293. Id. at 937.





299. Id. (citation omitted).
300. Id. Stevens hinted that this was a problem that would best be handled by the legislative branch, thus
pointing toward the political question doctrine.
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1. Textual
Justice Stevens made two major points in the area of textual analysis. He first
argued that the Tenth Amendment "confirm[ed] the principle that the powers of
the Federal Government are limited to those affirmatively granted by the
Constitution, but it does not purport to limit the scope.., of the exercise of pow-
ers that are delegated to Congress." ' His second point was that Federal law was
and is "'the supreme law of the land;"'"0 2 therefore, "there can be no conflict
between [the] duties to the State and those owed to the Federal Government.303
2. Historical
Justice Scalia, like Stevens, relied upon The Federalist Papers to clarify ques-
tions of intent of the Framers.0 One idea pulled from The Federalist was that
the "Founders intended to enhance the capacity of the federal government by
empowering it-as a part of the new authority [as opposed to the Articles of
Confederation] to make demands directly on individual citizens-to act through
local officials. 303 This statement summarized Stevens's opinion on why the his-
torical nature of the Constitution supported the dissent.
Justice Stevens asserted that the majority did not adequately consider the his-
torical evidence when reaching its conclusion.0 Stevens pointed out various
Federalist excerpts that discussed the importance of suborning the state govern-
ments to the execution of federal law. 7
On this topic, Stevens also addressed the difference between straight policy
decisions and the need for impressment of state officers during crises.308 The
prime example given by both sides was President Woodrow Wilson's actions dur-
ing World War 1.31 President Wilson was given by Congress the power to "uti-
lize the services of the state officers in implementing the World War I draft."
310
According to Stevens, this "surely indicates that the national legislature saw no
constitutional impediment to the enlistment of state assistance during a federal
emergency.
311
3. Federalism and Jurisprudence of the Court
Essentially, Justice Stevens argued that a separate rule or piece of legislation is
not needed to protect state sovereignty; one need only look at the structure of the
federal government itself.12 The case law of the Supreme Court, as viewed by
301. Id. at 942.




306. Id. at 945.
307. Id. See, THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton).
308. Printz, 521 U.S. at 952-53.
309. Id. at 953.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 956.
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Stevens, supported this view. The "composition of the Federal Government was
designed... to protect the states" from congressional usurpation.313
E. Justice Souter 's Dissent
Justice Souter agreed with the basic reasoning of Justice Stevens. 1 ' Quite sim-
ply, Souter believed "that the most straight-forward reading of [Federalist] No.
27 [was] authority for the Government's position... and that this reading is both
supported by No. 44 and consistent with Nos. 36 and 45. 315
Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist, stated that "the Legislatures, Courts
and Magistrates of the respective members will be incorporated into the opera-
tions of the National Government, as far as its just and constitutional authority
extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws. 316 Souter
believed that this reading (of No. 27) gave tacit approval for Congress to "incor-
porate" and make "auxiliary" the state governments. 7
Federalist No. 44 was also an important basis for Souter's dissenting opinion.
He latched onto the idea in No. 44 that the state officers, by oath, were simply
agents of the federal Constitution.318 His reading of No. 44 clearly supported and
gave credibility to his interpretation of No. 27. Justice Souter gave examples
from the history of the nation to support this agency/auxiliary theory, examples
such as state officers acting as tax collectors and the election of senators by the
state legislatures. 9
F Justice Breyer 's Dissent
Justice Breyer's rationale as to why Congress had the power to require CLEO
participation was simple: "[T]here is neither need nor reason to find in the
Constitution an absolute principle, the inflexibility of which poses a surprising
and technical obstacle to the enactment of a law that Congress believed neces-
sary to solve an important national problem. 320
V ANALYSIS
Printz made one thing clear: Congress cannot compel the states to implement
a "federal regulatory program.3 31 To have held otherwise would have blurred the
lines between the federal and state governments and would have greatly reduced
federalism.
Two cases were primarily relied upon in the principal case: New York and
FERC. The majority spent a great deal of time analogizing New York to the prin-
cipal case while attempting to distinguish the contrary holding in FERC.
313. Id. (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985)).
314. Id. at 970.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 971 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton)).
317. Id.
318. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison)).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 973.
321. Id. at 934.
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A. Scalia and New York
Justice Scalia placed much emphasis on the Court's analysis in New York. The
opinion in that case embodied many of the ideals that Scalia thought were perti-
nent in the principal case: the intent of the Framers to shy away from a national,
centralized government; the accountability of both the federal and states' govern-
ments; and the general principle that the federal government does not have the
power to compel the states to implement a federal scheme. 22
The government attempted to distinguish New York on several different
grounds. First, the government urged that New York could be distinguished
because the unconstitutional take title provision called for states to legislate poli-
cy in accordance with the provision. 23 Here, however, as the government urged,
"the background-check provision of the Brady Act [did] not require state legisla-
tive or executive officials to make policy, but instead issue[d] a final directive to
state CLEOs." '324 Essentially, according to the government, if the Act does not
call for policy-making, then the fact that states are commandeered is not
relevant.3"
Justice Scalia's answer to this assertion was that the "Government's distinction
between 'making law' and merely 'enforcing' it, between 'policymaking' and
mere 'implementation,' is an interesting one."32 What exactly constitutes making
policy? Is making a decision as to what constitutes a reasonable effort in making
a background check a form of policymaking? Justice Scalia certainly intimated
that such an exercise by a CLEO would indeed be considered policymaking. 27 If
it were policymaking, then under New York it would be automatically invalidated.
The government believed that because the Act did not devolve policymaking
responsibilities on the CLEOs, the Act was constitutional.
The analysis up to this point still leaves unanswered the issue of whether the
Act encroaches on state sovereignty. "Even assuming . . . that the Brady Act
leaves no 'policymaking' discretion with the States, we fail to see how that
improves rather than worsens the intrusion upon state sovereignty." '328 Thus,
according to the Court's reasoning, the Act will fail a constitutional test regard-
less of whether a policymaking role is given to the CLEOs.
The government's second argument to distinguish New York concerned the
issue of governmental accountability. 29 "The Government ... maintain[ed] that
requiring state officers to perform discrete, ministerial tasks specified by
Congress does not violate... New York because it does not diminish the account-
ability of state or federal officials.""0 Scalia gave two responses to this argu-
ment.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 926.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 927.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 928.
329. Id. at 929-30.
330. Id.
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First, "[b]y forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of imple-
menting a federal regulatory program," Congress either gets credit for a job well-
done or gets to shift the blame to the states if the program fails. 31 Second, in all
likelihood, the CLEO would be the official who would bear the brunt of any pub-
lic ill-will toward the program. 32
B. Historical
1. Historical Understanding of the Constitution
Justice Scalia noted the government's argument that early acts of Congress
almost routinely used state officials to implement federal law.33 The government
listed numerous examples of early congressional enactments that required state
officials' participation in implementation.3 ' "These early laws establish[ed], at
most, that the Constitution was originally understood to permit imposition of an
obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions, insofar as those pre-
scriptions related to matters appropriate for the judicial power."33 The majority,
therefore, did not believe that this portion of the government's argument provided
any weight to the final disposition of the case.
2. Impact of Holding
The holding of the Court seems to be a victory for states' rights activists; the
Court shot down an act that clearly surpassed the power of Congress. Those who
support limiting the availability of handguns will be dissatisfied with the deci-
sion; after all, according to the Court, if a CLEO does not wish to make a back-
ground check before a handgun is purchased, he is not required to do so. The
activists will see this ruling as a means for those who should not have possession
of a weapon LU acce ss to o withUOt U11e; wl l L1; al.t l.ro uH li4ig rCj.cct-
ed by the proper authorities. In the long run, anti-gun activists might argue that
the number of violent acts committed with handguns will increase.
Those on both sides of the issue (especially anti-gun activists) need to realize
one important point: the Supreme Court simply held that the mandatory back-
ground check system was unconstitutional. This portion of the Act was severed
from the rest of the Act, including the provisions that a CLEO may still voluntar-
ily undertake background checks on prospective handgun purchasers. Second,
and more important, the federal government must establish a national instant
background check system.336 This system will check the background of the
potential purchaser without CLEO participation.
331. Id. at 930.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 905-06.
334. Id. See, Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103; Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, § 2, 1 Stat. 567; Act
of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 2, 2 Stat. 154-55.
335. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907.
336. Id. at 902. This system was added on November 30, 1998.
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The introduction of the national instant background check system is a step in
the right direction. This procedure will alleviate the duty, voluntary as it is, of
the CLEOs to perform background checks. The national system will still permit
the checks to be made, but it will not require the time delay for purchases or
impose an onerous burden on those performing the check. Thus, the anti-gun
activists and gun advocates, as well as the states' rights advocates, should be
pleased with the new system.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that many Americans believe that the federal government is
too involved in the minute details of their daily lives; this group of Americans
sees only a strong, centralized government. This generalization cannot be readily
dismissed. The federal government has pervaded the state government on all lev-
els, including the sub-levels of state government such as county and municipal
governments. Some enjoy this involvement; others despise it. After all, the
Constitution calls for a federal system that protects the states from overreaching
by Congress. Many regulations, however, do in fact need to be promulgated by
the federal government. The government, however, simply needs to be careful in
the way that it proposes to have these regulations implemented. If the states feel
that a federal act is forcing them to perform what is essentially a federal function,
cases like Printz will arise.
The government has options to carry out its regulatory programs that do not
"compel" the states into action. As discussed earlier, ideas such as economic
incentives, placing conditions on the receipt of federal funds, or the outright pre-
emption of a particular field by the federal government are all viable options.
One thing is clear: the federal government may not compel the states to imple-
ment federal programs. Congress, however, often passes legislation that is con-
stitutionally questionable. Some of this legislation poses questions concerning
overreaching by Congress, as well as congressional encroachment on state sover-
eignty. This is a common result when Congress desires to regulate in a manner
prohibited by the Constitution.
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